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Lord William Bentinck and Murat
AMONG the minor personages of the Napoleonic period few havebeen more neglected, or, when remembered, more attacked,
than Lord William Bentinck. His qualities and his successes were
•ot of the brilliant character that earns popular appreciation ; his
defects were openly avowed; he served a tory ministry, though by
convictions a whig; and he was set problems of the greatest
difficulty to solve. Here are reasons enough for the more than
unhandsome treatment he has received. Yet a sober review of his
work can leave no other conclusion than that he was a statesman
of the greatest qualities of head and heart, and that where he only
partly failed most men would have failed completely. He was sent
out to the Mediterranean in the year 1811 to take command of the
British forces in Sicily, and to act as diplomatic representative at
the court of King Ferdinand. He remained the representative of
Great Britain in Sicily until the fall of Napoleon, and his mission
was marked by three chief incidents. The first of these was his
famous quarrel with Queen Mary Caroline, leading to the establish-
ment of a new Sicilian constitution and the driving of the queen
from the island. The second was his unsuccessful expedition to
Catalonia in 1818 to effect a diversion for Wellington. The third
was his negotiation with Joachim Murat, king of Naples, in
1818-4. It is with this last incident alone that the present
article is concerned.
Before coming to an account of this matter, however, it will be
best to state that two books published in 1902 deal with Lord
William Beutinck. One of these, La SiciUa durante I' occupazione
Inglese, by Signor Bianco, is chiefly concerned with the Sicilian
constitutional question, but also contains matter that throws light
on Bentinck's motives in his dealings with Murat and Italy. The
other, Le Prince Eugbie et Murat, by M. Weil,1 is an important
work of erudition, which takes up in close detail for the first time
every step of the negotiations, and concludes that Bentinck dis-
played in his dealings with Murat not only ineptitude but bad faith.
As no account of these matters save that of M. Weil has any
1
 See ant*, vol. xviii. p. 697.
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264 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK AND MURAT April
pretension to completeness or accuracy, it must be to a great
extent in following his footsteps that a clearer view of the subject
can be gained. The basis of this narrative will be the Becord Office
papers utilised by M. Weil, and others he has either overlooked or
thought it unnecessary to quote.
In the early weeks of 1818 Joachim Murat, king of Naples,
arrived in his capital from Poland, one of the few survivors of the
grande armie. His relations with Napoleon had been strained for
some years; more than once he had been threatened with the con-
fiscation of his crown; he was tired of war, and thought the
military supremacy of France lost with her army in the snows of
Russia. Very soon after his return to Naples he exchanged views
with the Austrian minister at his court. The emperor Francis
and Count Metternich were projecting intervention with a view to
mediation and peace. They were anxious to secure support, and
gave Joachim to understand that they were prepared to treat with
him on the basis of his retaining his present possessions. During the
spring of 1818 the king of Naples, who considered Austria now the
decisive military factor on the continent, pushed these negotiations
on the one hand, while on the other he declined to move his troops
north or to join the army in Germany, as Napoleon wished him to
do. But if Austria might be accounted the decisive military factor
on the continent, there was another power, Great Britain, whose
goodwill it was even more essential that the king of Naples should
secure. Her troops helped Ferdinand, the dispossessed king of
the throne now occupied by Murat, to maintain himself in the
island of Sicily; her fleets controlled the Mediterranean and
the Adriatic. A man of great character and ability, Lord William
Bentinck represented her interests at Palermo in the double
capacity of general-in-chief and diplomatic agent.
The five years of Joachim's reign had been marked by con-
tinuous hostilities with the Anglo-Sicilians, and now that all
French troops were being hurried into Germany, leaving only the
native army to defend his kingdom, it was evident that the king
had a great difficulty to face. At the best his army might suffice
to protect Naples and keep in check Bentinck's Anglo-Sicilians,
supported by a British fleet. Accordingly, when Joachim had
ascertained that Count Mettemich and the emperor of Austria
were not unfavourably disposed towards him, he decided to sound
the views of Great Britain as to whether that power might adopt a
similar attitude. The result proved a complete disappointment.
Bentinck proceeded from Sicily to the little island of Ponza, near
Naples, where he met the secret agents of the Neapolitan govern-
ment (May-June 1818), but the only conditions he was willing to
grant, without referring back to London, were hard oneB; they
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were based on two essential facts—that the British government
was allied to Ferdinand, who had not renounced his rights to the
throne of Naples, and that Bentinck considered Joachim's position
extremely weak and precarious. He demanded that the Neapolitan
army should immediately co-operate with those of the allies in an
attack on northern Italy, and that Joachim should surrender the
throne of Naples to Ferdinand; in return for this a territorial equi-
valent was to be provided, and there was to be no actual transfer
of the regal authority by Joachim until this compensation was
found.' These terms did not suit Murat; he replied evasively, yet
without definitely breaking off negotiations, probably hoping that
Austrian influence might obtain better conditions from the British
cabinet. Bentinck meanwhile, carrying out previous instructions,
crossed to Spain with a considerable expedition intended to effect a
diversion for Wellington, but he foresaw already that the negotia-
tions would be resumed, as they were in the following winter. On his
report of what had occurred to Lord Castlereagh the British foreign
secretary approved the course taken, and authorised Bentinck to
conclude an arrangement on the basis he had proposed. That
policy was consistently adhered to by both Castlereagh and Bentinck,
as is shown by the instructions given by the foreign secretary on
sending Lord Aberdeen as ambassador to Vienna (6 Aug. 1818),*
and by other dispatches to be quoted presently.
Through May, June, and July, while Napoleon was steadily
driving back the Bussians and Prussians, winning victories at
Liitzen and Bautzen, Murat remained irresolute at Naples. He
was secretly negotiating with Metternich, though outwardly pro-
fessing fidelity to France; but French influences were acting on
him. Letters came from the headquarters in Germany urging
him to join his old comrades ; and finally he came to one of those
impetuous decisions that so often led him to disaster in the field
of diplomacy, if also to triumph on the field of battle. Early in
August, just as Prince Eugene was leaving Milan to assume com-
mand of the French army in the Julian Alps, a travelling carriage
was swiftly conveying King Joachim across the Brenner Pass; he
was hastening to Napoleon's headquarters at Dresden. The king
of Naples remained with the army two months. He commanded
the right wing at the battle of Dresden, with brilliant success; he
afterwards assumed command of the army that opposed Schwarzen-
berg's march on Leipzig, and was present at the fighting about
that city. During all this period his relations with Napoleon were
much strained. By an extraordinary anomaly the Austrian and
' Bentinck's dispatches relating to the Ponza negotiations were published by Weil
in his Recueil at Documents Anglais tur Ponza, now incorporated in his Prince Engine,
I 6 -75.
• Rose, Napoleon, ii. 80L
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Neapolitan ministers were not withdrawn from their respective
posts, and the king resolutely declined to move a single soldier
north from Naples, though frequently ordered to do so by the
emperor. There were stormy scenes between the emperor and the
king, and finally, after the crushing disaster of Leipzig, Murat
abandoned the army. His return to Naples was the flight of an
escaping prisoner; his arrival in his capital, in the first week of
November, was a complete surprise to all.
No sooner was Joachim Murat safely out of the clutches of his
terrible brother-in-law than he showed unmistakable signs that he
had decided to assert an independent line of policy. The Austrian
minister, Count Mier, who was still at Naples, soon obtained
definite proposals for the conclusion of an Austro-Neapoh'tan
alliance.4 But there was a consideration only less powerful than
the conservation of his throne that swayed Murat in a contrary
direction to that represented by bis proposals to Austria. The
king's ambitions happened to coincide with a natural policy that
appeared the only one that could bring back prestige and some
measure of success to Napoleon. The whole of the Italian penin-
sula, for the first time since the days of Borne, was under the same
master, the same system of government. In the kingdom of Italy,
the French departments, and the kingdom of Naples, the military,
judicial, and administrative systems were practically identical.
Natives of all parts of the peninsula were fighting under the same
flag; but one word pronounced by Napoleon would have created
Italy a nation, would have revived his failing fortune with an
accession of strength based on public opinion, and would have placed
a new enemy at Austria's door.
There had been for some years in Italy a small but active, intelli-
gent, intriguing party with nationalist tendencies. Its members
hoped for the eventual unification of the peninsula under an inde-
pendent government framed on the French model. This party
was strongest at Naples, where it included most of the native
officials. The king was on good terms with its most conservative
and able members, such men as Zurlo, minister of the interior,
Bicciardi, and others. From the time of Joachim's return from
Russia in the early part of 1818, the idea of Italian independence
and unity assumed a concrete shape in his mind. It hinged
principally on military considerations that may be reduced to two
propositions : the 80,000 useful troops that Murat could send over
the Po were sufficient to turn the scale as between the armies
attacking and defending Italy; the uniting of the forces of the
northern provinces and of Naples under Murat's command, the
declaration that they were fighting for the unity and indepen-
4
 M. Weil has well established that the OUendorf interview, hitherto accepted u
fact, is purely imaginary.
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dence of Italy, would result in a movement of public opinion that
would infuse spirit into the national army and enable it to roll
back the tide of Austrian invasion.
On his return to his capital Joachim at once decided that he
would send no more Neapolitan troops to reinforce the emperor.
He constantly asserted that he was willing to march to the Po with
80,000 men at his back, and hinted that if they were to be employed
in Bupport of the viceroy's army, it would be necessary that he
should have supreme command. Even after he joined the imperial
headquarters at Dresden he could not be persuaded to order rein-
forcements north to assist Prince Eugene in the defence of Venetia
against the Austrians. Now that he had once more left the army,
and had deliberately embarked on an independent policy, he still
thought the best hope for himself, for Italy, and even for Napoleon,
was the proclamation of Italian unity and independence under
his rule. During November and December his letters to Napoleon,
recently brought to light by the researches of Baron Lumbroso
and M. Weil, urged that policy as the only cure for a nearly
impossible position. They also clearly conveyed the fact that
if Napoleon would not adopt that policy, then Murat would be
obliged to save his crown by coming to terms with the allies. But
Napoleon viewed the possibility of his insubordinate lieutenant's
aggrandisement, just at the moment when his own fortune was
failing, with jealous dislike. It was not in his nature to make
concessions, and he made none.
King Joachim was thus simultaneously making proposals to
Austria for an alliance and pressingly entreating Napoleon to
accept the conditions on which he was prepared to co-operate with
him. In either eventuality his army would be required on the Po,
and its advance was quietly begun. The French departments,
formerly the States of the Church, had been drained of troops, and
the Neapolitans were everywhere received as allies by the emperor's
functionaries. At the same time as he pressed his negotiations
with the court of Vienna, Murat had felt the necessity of once
more attempting to arrive at an understanding with Great Britain.
It was, in fact, the weak point of his policy, leaving questions of
political morality on one side, that it was not based on a clear
recognition of the fact that he could not safely detach himself from
France until he had secured the friendship of the great power
whose fleets and armies were at the very gates of his capital. He
should either have negotiated with the British cabinet in the first
place or have made the vital condition of his treaty with Austria
that that power should obtain the recognition by Great Britain of
his tenure of the throne of Naples. Under the exigencies of a very
false and difficult position Joachim fell short of this indispensable
basis of safety and suffered in consequence.
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Shortly after the king's return from Leipzig a Neapolitan
agent, Schinina by name, was sent to Sicily to open negotiations
with Bentinck. The two met at Syracuse on 12 Dec. Schi-
nina asked Bentinck to sign an armistice, on the ground that
a treaty of alliance was about to be concluded between Austria and
Naples, and that Joachim could not move his troops north in
support of the Austrians unless assured that he had no attack to
fear from the Anglo-Sicilians. As evidence of .the Austrian atti-
tude he produced dispatches showing that on 7 Oct. Metternich
had offered Murat recognition at the price of an alliance. But
Bentinck was not satisfied as to the sincerity of these overtures,
and pointed to the fact that since the date of Metternich's pro-
posals the king of Naples had taken part in the battle of Leipzig.
He could see no reason to assume that Metternich would be pre-
pared to repeat an offer made before an event of such magnitude,
and on that ground declined to negotiate. This was a pretext,
though not a bad one. Bentinck's real motives for refusing to
negotiate were probably somewhat mixed; he appears, for one
thing, to have been jealous of Austrian influence. He wanted
Italy to become free and England to help her on the way to
freedom; he thought the most effective military weapon against
Napoleon would be a national insurrection similar to that which
had enabled the British arms to win such signal triumphs in Spain.
Perhaps he even dreamed of becoming the Wellington of Italy.
These views were somewhat insecurely founded, but Bentinck
made no mistake when he considered Marat's position at Naples
very precarious, and it is difficult to see that he committed an
error of judgment in declining to enter into negotiations of which
the firBt result would have been to enable Murat to move 80,000
men to the valley of the Po. M. Weil believes this to have been
extremely bad diplomacy, and is entitled to his opinion ; but he
goes further and clearly suggests that this was a virtual disobedi-
ence of orders on the part of Bentinck, for he had received
instructions from Lord Gastlereagh authorising him to conclude an
armistice.8 This suggestion is unwarranted. The dispatches of
Castlereagb had reference to the Ponza negotiations in the early
part of the year. How can it be said that in declining Schinina's
overtures Bentinck disobeyed his instructions, when these referred
back to events occurring before King Joachim left Naples for the
campaign of Germany, and were merely permissive ? So far from
adopting such a criticism it may fairly be said that Bentinck would
have been extremely imprudent had he accepted the Neapolitan
proposals.
At the very moment when Bentinck was declining the
• Weil, iii. 288.
 at Sim
on Fraser U
niversity on June 14, 2015
http://ehr.oxfordjournals.org/
D
ow
nloaded from
 
1904 LORD WILLIAM BENTINCK AND MURAT 269
overtures of the king of Naples the British and Austrian cabinets
were formally exchanging views on the Neapolitan question. On
Austria's joining the allies against Napoleon in the early part of
August 1813 the British cabinet had resumed relations with that
of Vienna, and had selected as ambassador Lord Aberdeen. The
choice was not a good one, for Aberdeen was young and totally
unversed in diplomacy. He was eager to help on with all his
might the downfall of Napoleon, but failed to keep clearly in Bight
the distinctions between British and Austrian policy, and proved
perfectly pliable in the dexterous fingers of Mettemich.* Metternich,
who had no treaty with the court of Palermo to hamper him, was
still determined to detach Murat from Napoleon and to bring the
Neapolitans to the assistance of the Austrian army now operating
against Prince Eugene in northern Italy. Having received pro-
posals for an alliance through Prince Cariati, Neapolitan minister
at Vienna, and Count Mier, Austrian minister at Naples, Metter-
nich decided, early in December, to conclude the matter on the
basis of Murat's being guaranteed his throne of Naples. He
consequently sounded Aberdeen as to the concurrence of his
government. Now the British ambassador's instructions were
that Great Britain could not consent to the alienation of King
Ferdinand's rights to Naples, but that the provision of a ' liberal
establishment' for Murat in central Italy by way of compensation
could be entertained.7 Yet Metternich succeeded in obtaining a
note from him on 12 Dec, in which Aberdeen stated that he had
taken cognisance of the instructions given by Metternich to Count
Neipperg for negotiating an alliance with the king of Naples; that
he saw nothing in these instructions contrary to the views of the
British government; that he must, however, declare formally that
the British government would not become party to a treaty guaran-
teeing Naples to Murat without providing a just compensation to
the king of Sicily. To this Metternich replied that the indemnifi-
cation of King Ferdinand, in case he should renounce his rights to
Naples, was an essential part of the views of the Austrian court and
would be provided for by the treaty it was proposed to conclude.8
It is clear that in this exchange of notes Aberdeen was in error.
For the policy of Great Britain was to compensate Murat for Naples,
while that of Austria, to which he assented, was to compensate
Ferdinand—a very different matter. And it is further clear from
dispatches and instructions already quoted that both Castlereagh
and Bentinck held to the British policy unwaveringly. It will also
be shown presently that neither of them was deluded into following
* Foreign Office, Austria, 102, and W»r Office, Sicily, 182; Aberdeen's dispatches,
September to December 1818 (in part referred to by M. Weil).
' Foreign Office, Austria, 102, 6 Aug. 1813. • Weil, iii. 227, 228.
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Aberdeen's false lead. In all this there is one obvious fact to be
recognised, and that is that the British ambassador to the court of
Vienna was far too young and inexperienced for his extremely
delicate post. To show how loose and changeable were his ideas
as to the direction British policy should take in this matter, it will
suffice to quote the following sentence from one of his dispatches
to Gastlereagh on the subject of Murat: ' The grand thing in
the first instance is to precipitate his acts of hostility against
Bonaparte without committing ourselves by any engagement or
precise understanding.'9 Having fallen into line with Mettemich,
Aberdeen immediately wrote to Lord William Bentinck, enclosing
copies of the notes exchanged, stating that Count Neipperg would
inform him of the course of his negotiations, and that Austria
was anxious to conclude matters rapidly, so as to bring up the
Neapolitans to assist in the operations against Prince Eugene. He
added that,, with these facts and his instructions from home,
Bentinck should be able to conclude a convention on parallel lines
with Neipperg's. This dispatch from the British representative at
Frankfort to the British representative at Palermo is taken by M.
Weil to amount to formal instructions to Bentinck to negotiate a
treaty with Naples; Aberdeen's policy is treated by him as the
policy of Great Britain. From these two gratuitous and untenable
assumptions he proceeds to attack Lord William Bentinck in
reiterated terms of the greatest bitterness and contempt for dis-
obeying instructions in not negotiating a treaty with Murat. And
he goes even further by accusing him of disobedience at a period
when, on M. Weil's own showing, be had not received these so-
called instructions. As a matter of fact Aberdeen's dispatch
reached Bentinck at Palermo on 18 Jan.,10 and on 8 Feb. he signed
an armiBtice (not a treaty) at Naples.
We must now take up the thread of the narrative again at
Schinina's failure to open negotiations with Bentinck on 12 Dec.
While conferring with Bentinck a dispatch reached him from
Mentz; in this the Austrian charge d'affaires at Naples stated that
he had advices from Mettemich of 28 Oct. informing him that a
treaty was about to be concluded between Austria and Naples, and
that Lord Aberdeen had full powers to sign a treaty on behalf of
Great Britain. To this Bentinck replied, with some force, that he
was only confirmed in his resolve not to negotiate by the fact that
Lord Aberdeen had full powers.11 Austrian diplomacy was, in fact,
trying to effect with Bentinck what it had succeeded in doing with
Aberdeen, but had found a more wary antagonist. Bentinck was
devoid of all official information, yet he suspected that misleading
or partial statements were being placed before him; and his
• Foreign Office, Austria, 102, 10 Nov. 1813. '• Weil, iii. 487.
11
 Ibid. iii. 330, 570; Menti to Bentinek, 14 Dec. 1813.
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suspicions were true. For Aberdeen's instructions were, as we
have Been, that Great Britain was prepared to see Murat com-
pensated for surrendering the throne of Naples, and Bentinck
would have been tacitly admitting Murat's title to Naples and
abandoning Ferdinand's claim had he entered on a negotiation for
a treaty of peace. Yet M. Weil sees in this dispatch of Mentz, t
dispatch that contains a perversion of the truth, la prmve la plvt
iiuliscutablc . . . de la perfidie et de la disobSissance de Bentinck.1
On receipt of this communication from Mentz Bentinck perceivec
clearly enough that some modification in the relations of Mura
with the allies was in progress; he accordingly showed a mon
conciliatory front. He now began to feel his way diplomatically
but with the utmost caution. He merely informed Mentz and Gallo
the Neapolitan minister for foreign affairs, that he was anxious U
co-operate so as to further the intentions of the Austrian ant
British cabinets, but that he was in complete ignorance as to tb
terms of the treaties and must wait for information. Thes^
communications he intrusted to his secretary, Mr. Graham, t
whom he ostensibly gave powers to conclude a suspension of hos
tilitdes. He, however, handed him secret instructions to concludi
nothing, to get all the information he could at Naples, and, i
possible, to find some pretext for getting passports with which U
proceed to the headquarters of the allies. There Bentinck hopec
Graham would be able to get precise information or instructions
from Aberdeen or Castlereagh. As Bentinck had received nc
official news for some two months either from England or the
Adriatic, this would hardly appear so very extraordinary as M.
Weil would have us think.18 He also informed the Sicilian court
of the overtures made and of his attitude, and was notified of its
approval of the course he had adopted.
Graham sailed from Palermo on 1 Jan. 1814; only the day
before Count Neipperg had arrived at Naples with full powers to
sign the Austro-Neapolitan treaty of alliance. Graham, who
appears to have conducted himself with diplomatic ability, learned
from Neipperg that the chief reason for Austria's entering into the
treaty was the non-success of Field-Marshal Hiller's operations in
front of the Quadrilateral, and also heard that there was little
prospect of dislodging Prince Eugene from that position without
the prompt co-operation of the Neapolitans. On 8 Jan. Graham,
having obtained passports, left Naples for the headquarters of the
allies ; on the same day Neipperg wrote to Bentinck urging him to
conclude an armistice, setting out at length the military reasons
that made the Neapolitan co-operation so valuable to Austria, and
confidentially communicating the terms of the treaty. It pro-
vided for the joint prosecution of the war; the emperor of Austria
15
 Weil, iii. 230. '» Ibid. iil. 351.
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guaranteed Joachim's actual possessions; the principle of an
indemnity to King Ferdinand was recognised; the emperor of
Austria agreed to use his best offices to obtain Ferdinand's renun-
ciation of the throne of Naples and to facilitate the conclusion of a
peace with Great Britain. There were farther provisions not rele-
vant to the question here dealt with.
It is curious, after reading the violent criticisms of the British
agent's conduct that are to be found in M. Weil's book, the weary-
ing reiteration that he was acting in flagrant disobedience to the
instructions of his government, to find the text of the Austro-Nea-
politan treaty producing on Bentinck exactly the same effect that it
produced on Castlereagh, whose conduct M. Weil does not venture
to attack. The point was simply this : that Austria was, and Great
Britain was not, prepared to sacrifice Ferdinand to Joachim. How
far the divergence of views between the two powers really went may
be judged by the fact that Neipperg confidentially communicated to
the duke di Gallo that his instructions from Metternich authorised
him to give a verbal assurance that Austria would, in case of
necessity, employ force to compel King Ferdinand's renunciation of
his rights to Naples.14 Castlereagh, who had thought it expedient
to join the headquarters of the allies and to take charge of Great
Britain's interests in person, wrote to Metternich informing him
that the perusal of the treaty had caused him a painful impression,
as it constituted an obstacle to the restoration of Ferdinand on the
conclusion of a general peace. Yet he had decided to send instruc-
tions to Bentinck to conclude a convention for the cessation of
hostilities. But he called Prince Metternich's attention to the fact
that an understanding with the court of Palermo would have to be
reached before there could be any question of terminating the state
of war between Great Britain and Naples." This warning of
Castlereagh is most important as marking the British position.
An armistice—that is, a temporary cessation of hostilities—might
be concluded as a concession or matter of expediency; but a per-
manent peace must be based on the satisfaction of King Ferdinand's
claims. Bentinck thought even worse of the treaty than Castle-
reagh, from whom he was still waiting for instructions. In a
dispatch of which M. Weil gives a very inaccurate text18 Bentinck
declared the Austro-Neapolitan treaty impolitic, inopportune, and
useless, and returned to his argument that from the point of view
both of Great Britain and Italy it would be far better to act in oppo-
sition to Murat and provoke a national rising against the French.
Neipperg's letter asking Bentinck to sign an armistice with the
i ing of Naples proved ineffective for the moment. The British
agent declared that until he heard from Aberdeen or Castlereagh
» Weil, ill. 818. '» Cjutlereagh, Corrttpondenct, ix. 106, 27 Jan. 1814.
" See below, p. 279.
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he would not commit himself. On receipt of thi3 unsatisfactory
reply Neipperg forwarded to Palermo Aberdeen's dispatch of
12 Dec., which he had so far withheld ; this reached Bantinck on
18 Jan. Bat the Auetro-Neapolitan treaty was one he did not
approve, and he probably viewed Aberdeen's diplomacy with no
great confidence. Besides this he felt that precise instructions
from the British foreign secretary, either through Graham or some
other source, must now be well on their way. He at all events
decided to wait, while announcing that he would cross to Naples
and negotiate. This conduct M. Weil thinks highly discreditable.
Bentinck now had received what M. Weil persists in calling the
instructions of his government, but what was really a mere advice
from the British representative at the Austrian court. Any other
diplomatist would have straightway proceeded to Naples, he says,
instead of which Bentinck persisted in his obstinate disobedience.
What is the real fact ? Bentinck looked for instructions to Castle-
reagh, not to Aberdeen. The latter certainly did agree with the
Austro-Neapolitan treaty; he announced its terms with satisfaction
to Gastlereagh a few days before the latter joined the headquarters
of the allies. But the latter did not share Aberdeen's views ; he
addressed the note already quoted to Metternich, and Bentinck
took the same position, only more strongly. It is not fair to blame
Bentinck, isolated in Sicily and for many weeks cut off from all
certain knowledge of what was proceeding, for choosing a dilatory
course. On the contrary, he showed the wariness, perspicacity,
and insight of a statesman, by holding back until he knew with
certainty what coarse British policy would take at this very difficult
turning-point, and by resolutely keeping bis government free from
dangerous complications both with the court of Palermo and with
that of Naples.
Castlereagh, to whose fine judgment and diplomatic skill at
this critical period history has done scant justice, wisely decided
that the only course now open was to make the best of a bad
bargain. He did not approve of the Austro-Neapolitan treaty, yet
the vital object was the concentration of all available military forces
against Napoleon. He therefore decided to subordinate the ques-
tion of Naples, and, as we have already seen, to offer an armistice,
though not a treaty of peace. M. Weil quotes Castlereagh's
dispatch to Metternich, in which he declares that the state of war
between Great Britain and Naples must continue, subject to an
armistice (27 Jan.), and also his instructions to Bentinck (22 Jan.,
from Bale), and yet in the face of these documents accuses Ben-
tinck of disobedience and obstinacy for not being prepared to
discuss a treaty of peace with the Neapolitan negotiators.17 The
British agent only offered an armistice, and had he done more
» WeiJ, iii. 61fi.
VOL. XDC.—NO. LXXTV. X
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would have deserved to be dismissed. Proceeding to Naples from
Palermo on 90 Jan., Bentinck concluded the armistice on 8 Feb.
It provided for the cessation of hostilities, the opening of commerce,
and three months' notice of the resumption of hostile operations.
The signature of this convention marks the close of the first period of
the negotiations between Bentinck and Murat, a period during which
it is confidently asserted that the British agent showed fine diplo-
matic judgment and carried out the policy of the British cabinet.18
A second period now opens, in which it will not be possible to
speak of Bentinck's conduct with such unqualified praise. The
great question in the early weeks of 1814 was the military one.
In France the genius of Napoleon nearly sufficed to check the tide
of invasion. In Italy the viceroy, Prince Eugene, had fought a
successful defensive battle on the line of the Mincio, and had
arrested the forward movement of the Austrians under Marshal
Bellegarde (8 Feb. 1814). The king of Naples had marched his
army to the neighbourhood of Bologna. It was now decided that
Bentinck should support the military operations against France by
attacking Genoa. To arrive at this result he decided to move a body
of some 14,000 or 15,000 Anglo-Sicilians from Messina and Palermo
to northern Italy. He hoped to land at Leghorn, to take possession
of Tuscany, whence he would draw hiB supplies, and from this base to
advance along the Eiviera di Levante. An exchange of views as to
the military situation took place between Bentinck and Neipperg, and
the latter agreed to the proposed plan of operations. But by the
time the Anglo-Sicilians were prepared to take their part in the
campaign Tuscany was in the occupation of the Neapolitans, and
this proved a difficulty that nearly led to a rupture between Murat
and Bentinck. The British agent failed to adapt himself to the
new situation created by the Austro-Neapolitan alliance and the
Anglo-Neapolitan armistice. If the British government was pre-
pared to grant an armistice to Murat, such a concession could only
have one meaning—that his military co-operation against Prince
Eugene was urgently required. It was, therefore, clearly the duty
of the representative of that government to avoid all causes of
friction with the king of Naples. But Bentinck was not an
amiable man ; he had diplomatic instinct, the tact of large things,
>• One subsidiary point need not be discussed here, what may be referred to as the
jRA» <Ttin Voyageur incident. M. Well has nothing new to ofler on the •<*)«* »°d
is apparently unacquainted with the interesting documents recently published by
SignorBLanco (SicMa . P occupaiion. IngUu). It will suffice to say. for the present
purpose that Bentinck had a personal policy aiming at the preservation of the liberal
iut tat ions he had fostered in Sicily; he hoped that if Ferdinand recovered Naples he
would be willing to admit a virtual British protectorate over Sicily that would maintain
parliamentary institutions in the island. That hope had arisen from a suggestion first
thrown out by Queen Mary Caroline, and ninoe adopted by Bentinok and some of Uie
liberal leaders in SloUy. This matter is also referred to in the manuscript memoirs
of Queen Mary Caroline.
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bnt not of small ones. He clung firmly to his opinions, and had
rigid, sometimes peculiar ideas; he had not the faculty of rapidly
seizing the changing aspects of a situation and adapting himself to
them. Castlereagh waB now quite clear that the point of first
importance in Italy was to get the Neapolitans in action and force
Prince Eugene back from the Quadrilateral to the Alps, but Ben-
tinck still kept foremost the fact that Marat was in reab'ty an
enemy who must expect no concessions. Castlereagh had decided
to let discussion with Murat go for the present, but Bentinck could
not realise the first importance of the operations against the
Quadrilateral, and still vaguely clung to a hope that his cherished
scheme of an Italian national movement might be evolved from the
circumstances of the times.
The earliest indication of his mistaken position was given on
the embarkation of the first division of his army at Palermo. On
this occasion the hereditary prince addressed a proclamation to
the Sicilian soldiers taking part in the expedition, in which he
exhorted them to do their duty and asked them to remember that
the king had never renounced his rights to the throne of Naples.
This was certainly true, but, us the expedition was under the com-
mand of Lord William Bentinck, in whose hands the hereditary
prince was a mere puppet, its effect was that of a British threat
against Murat. However correct the theory of the proclamation
might be, there can be no question that it was extremely ill-timed,
and that it was from every point of view an inexcusable mistake.
For Bentinck's conduct on his arrival in Tuscany there is some
excuse to be made, though it was clearly enough ill-judged. He
left Palermo on 28 Feb. and reached Leghorn on 8 March.
By the 12th his first division was landed. Having issued a procla-
mation calling on the people of Italy to rise and win their national
independence, he decided to occupy the time while his transports
were returning to Sicily for the second division in visiting the
headquarters of King Joachim and Marshal Bellegarde, to settle
various military and political questions. He arrived at Beggio,
where Murat was quartered, on the night of 15 March. What
was the position as it then presented itself to the British agent ?
Tuscany was nearly entirely under the control of the Neapolitan
civil and military officials. The Papal States, the Marches, and
a great part of Bomagna had likewise been occupied, so that
Joachim was in actual possession of rather more than one half of
the Italian peninsula. His officials were everywhere proclaiming
the approaching independence of Italy under the king of Naples.
Nothing could be more vexatious to Bentinck than this; nothing
could strengthen him more in the opinion that the policy of the
Austro-Neapolitan treaty of alliance was a wrong one. But facts
even more striking confirmed his view that the only rational
T a
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course was to treat Murat aB an enemy. For two months the
Neapolitan army had remained inactive in Bomagna, and Prince
Eugene was still skilfully foiling his opponents on the line of the
Mincio. Joachim had persistently declined to act until he had
received the ratification of his treaty with Austria. This did not
reach him until 8 March. He had during all this time been in
uninterrupted communication with Prince Eugene and the French
camp, and was evidently meditating treachery. Marshal Belle-
garde hardly hoped for the Neapolitans' assistance and feared^they
might at any moment fall on his flank as enemies. From the few
Austrian officers he met on his arrival at Reggio Bentinck heard
that they looked on the king of Naples as a traitor who was only
awaiting a turn of fortune in favour of France to sell them to the
enemy. He learned that ten days earlier the viceroy had released
some Neapolitan soldiers who had been taken prisoners; that
although the Neapolitans had got into action after the arrival of
the Austrian ratification the king had permitted a French divi-
sion, surrounded at Reggio, to make its escape. Bentinck now
completely lost sight of the fact that Marat's treasonable intent
was a matter of subordinate interest, providing his troops could be
actually got into action on the viceroy's exposed flank. He
assumed a dictatorial tone ; his tactlessness led him so far that he
wore the Sicilian cockade in his hat, and avoided using the expres-
sions ' sire' and ' majesty' when addressing the king. He de-
manded the immediate abandonment of Tuscany and the energetic
prosecution of the campaign by Marat; he reminded him that the
treaty he had secured from Austria was founded on his armed co-
operation, failing which it had neither value nor force ; he went so
far as to threaten an immediate attack on Naples if his demands
were not complied with.
The roughness of Bentinck's declarations was not entirely a
matter of temper or bad manners. Bentinck was far too able
to be judged in such superficial fashion; he was certainly con-
stitutionally deficient in urbanity, but the attitude he assumed
represented more than that. He considered Joachim a weak man
in a weak position, and, basing his calculations on that estimate,
he thought a show of brutal strength would conquer all oppo-
sition and enable him to dictate terms; but he was mistaken.1*
His galling behaviour and threatening declarations, coming after
the proclamation to the Sicilian troops, were taken to mean un-
compromising hostility. Murat, who ever since he had received the
ratification of his treaty had been seriously prosecuting military
operations, now thought he had nothing to hope for. He deter-
mined therefore to retain Tuscany, to renew his negotiations with
Prince Eugene and the emperor on the basis of Napoleon's ceding
» W»r Office, Sicily, 182, Bentinck to Bathurst, 87 Feb. 1814.
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him all Italy south of the Fo, and stopped the advance of his
troops. Having failed to obtain satisfaction at Keggio, Bentinck
proceeded to Verona, where Bellegarde had fixed his headquarters.
There he discussed matters with the Austrian commander and the
Britiflh officer on his staff, Sir Eobert "Wilson, who was as distin-
guished for his charm of manner as Bentinck was for his bluntness.
In every quarter opinion was against Bentinck. It was not very
material to the Austrians whether the Neapolitans or the Britiflh
momentarily controlled Tuscany; what they wanted in the first
place was that Murat should be persuaded by some means or other
to march his army on Piacenza. That done, the line of the Mincio
must fall, and Prince Eugene must retreat to the Alps. The
Austrian view was entirely supported by Sir Eobert Wilson at
Verona, and Castlereagh wrote despatches from France to Bentinck
enjoining on him a conciliatory attitude towards Murat and the
subordination of his operations to Bellegarde's.
Bentinck was profoundly displeased at the situation; he was
angered at finding that Prince Eugene with his small army of
conscripts could successfully hold Lombardy against the much
larger forces of the allies. He ascribed the failure to the adoption
of the Austrian policy, instead of that on which he had set his
heart. Yet the unanimity of opinion against him, the representa-
tions of Bellegarde and Wilson, the tenor of his instructions, all
warned him that he had gone very far. He appears to have
realised that he was no longer acting in the spirit of his instruc-
tions, and on returning to the Neapolitan headquarters, now at
Bologna, he took Wilson with him. All felt that an understanding
of some sort must be come to. Murat now put forward a new
proposal: he offered to evacuate Tuscany if Great Britain would
sign peace; this was immediately rejected by Wilson.10 On
2 April a note was drawn up by Bentinck and presented to Gallo.
In this document are clear indications that the British agent felt
that he must abandon the position he had taken up at Beggio,
though it can hardly be described as conciliatory. He formally
declared that Great Britain approved the Austro-Neapolitan treaty
and that the signature of a treaty of peace was declined merely out
of consideration for the just claims of the allied Sicilian govern-
ment. He invited the Neapolitan government to consider the
question of compensation to King Ferdinand with a view to
** M. Weil states within the space of one paragraph: (1) that Bentinck in
declining to open negotiations for a treaty of peace was deliberately aiming at a
rupture with Marat (of this there is not one scrap of evidence); and (3) that the
king's proposal to evaouate Tuscany in return for a treaty of peace exasperated
Bentinck. Bat if Bentinck was aiming at a rapture, as M. Weil declares, he ought, on
the contrary, to hare been delighted, and not exasperated, at Marat's offer, for his
instructions and the whole coarse of British policy gave him no choice bat to decline
it (iv. 467).
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arriving at a settlement. But in addition to these official views
Bentinck stated a personal opinion. He complained that the
Neapolitan government had not participated in the military
operations, and that suspicious negotiations had taken place with
the French camp; he also protested against the apparent project
of permanent occupation of the territory overrun by the Neapolitan
army. He concluded by recommending, not demanding, the cession
of part of Tuscany to facilitate the British operations, a prompt
co-operation with the Austrians, and the renunciation of all projects
of political aggrandisement.*1 This groasiire et insolente communi-
cation, as it is described by M. Weil, was dealt with skilfully.
Gallo merely addressed a polite note to Bentdnok, in which he
stated that he could not accept his views, as he found them in
disaccord with those of Lord Castlereagh as transmitted by the
Neapolitan minister at the headquarters of the allies, Prince
Cariati. Under these circumstances he would continue negotiations
through the intermediary of the latter.
Bentinck's efforts had failed, and there was nothing left for him
to do but to return to his army and accomplish what was possible.
A few days later came the news of the abdication of Napoleon at
Fontainebleau; it found the Anglo-Sicilian army in possession of
Genoa and Spezzia, the king of Naples under the walls of Piacenza,
the Austrians still facing the viceroy on the Mincio.M
B. M. JOHNSTOK.
NOTE.
A serious blot on M. Weil's book, which invalidates his judgments
and cannot be passed over, is his chronic inaccuracy. He must be judged
by the highest standard of accuracy, for he has devoted no less than ten
years to research, and his book is nearly entirely founded on unpublished
military and diplomatic dispatches. The inaccuracies of a trifling or
typographical character are extraordinarily numerous; it may be that
they are fewest in the first volume, most numerous in the third. A few
examples must be given as a matter of fairness. Thus in the account of
the engagement fought at Caldiero three spellings of the name of that
«' Weil, iv. 460.
** A trifling incident that took place after the termination of hostilities illustrates
the distortion of M. Weil's views on the subject of Lord William Bentinck. King
Joachim, as a matter of regal courtesy, offered the Grand Cross of the Order of the Two
Sicilies to Marshal Bellegarde, and sent his own sword to Lord William Bentinck.
Bellegarde declined the Order; Bentinck, though loth to accept the sword, as
he explained to Castlereagh, thought it his public duty to take it, and wrote to
Joachim a perfectly proper letter of acknowledgment, of which the first words were,
• Sire, the sword of a great captain is the most flattering gift that can be offered to a
soldier.' M. Weil compares Bellegarde's conduct with Bentinck's in this matter, and
concludes in favour of Bellegarde (iv. 669, note). He further gravely assures us
that every word of Bentinck's letter to the king cost the writer a ' shriek of fury.'
This is not good sense, not even good rhetoric It only confirms the opinion that
M. Weil has completely failed to grasp the character and the conduct of the English
statesman.
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place are given,' Caldier,'' Caldiero,' and ' Calderoin;' this is the more
confusing as there happens to be a village named Calderino within a few
miles of Caldiero (vol. iii.) In Hiller's army orders of 12 Oct. 1818
(ii. 274) the march of Fenner's and of Eckbardt's divisions on Trieste
is absurdly impossible, and should be on a point in the upper valley
of the Adige. The British prisoners of 1808 were taken at Capri, not
at Capua (iii. 196). But small slips, even when so numerous as they
are in this case, are less important than the incorrect quotation of
documents. In some cases, perhaps one in thirty, M. Weil does not give
a reference at all; more often his reference lacks precision, as ' Foreign
Office, 98,' for ' Foreign Office, Sicily, 9 8 ; ' with scarcely an exception
he fails to indicate typographically where passages have been omitted.
But for the purpose of this article the texts of documents as given by
M. Weil have been tested for verbal accuracy at two points only with
the following results: In the first case (iii 112), that of a dispatch
from Mnrat to Colletta, which is strangely described as presque inidite
(the fact being that it was published in 1861), a comparison of M. Weil's
text with the original to whioh he refers discloses twelve errors in tran-
scription ; of these most are trivial, and there is only one serious
omission, of nine words. The second case is far worse. The same
dispatch is here given twice (iii. 825 and iii. 418). It is important to
note that in this case we are dealing with a translation from a dispatch
of Bentdnok to Castlereagh, written in English from Palermo on 14 July
1814. Here is the text as given at the two pages. In both cases it is
in inverted commas and without indication of omissions:—
' J'ai toujours craint de voir
Neipperg se laisser jouer par la
cour de Naples. Les conditions ' Lea conditions de ce traits sont
de ce traite' sont a la fois impoli- impolitiques, inopportunes et inu-
tiques, inopportunes et inutiles. tiles. Murat, j 'en suis sur, se serait
contents d'un equivalent pour
Naples. De toute facon il est
inadmissible qu'il ait jamais r£ve*
d'obtenir plus que Naples.
' II n'y a aucun fond a faire sur < II n'y a auoun fond a faire BUT
Murat. Murat. II convient done de lui
dormer le mains possible. Le
' Et le traite" ne nous cr£e pas traite" ne cre"e pas seulement un
seulement un rival, il pent rendre rival a l'Autriche, il rend Murat
Murat maltre de l'ltalie. Quand maltre de l'ltalie. Quand on aura
on aura rejete" le vice-roi sur les rejeW le vice-roi au dela des Alpes
Alpes, les Italiens graviteront cer- pour qui son arm6e d'ltalie et
tainement de son cote", d'ltaliens prendra-t-elle parti V
Les Italiens n'aiment pas les Au-
trichiens. La preuve en est dans
la resistance que le vice-roi leur
oppose avec des Italiens.
' Us preierent done Murat a
l'Autriohe. II est devenu prince
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italien et s'est declare le cham-
pion de l'independance italienne.
L'intervention de l'Angleterre
tandia qne, si la protection et
l'asaistance de l'Angleterre B'eten-
daient sor eux, cette grande force
se serait, Bans aucnn doute, tournee
de notre cdte. On aurait alors
provoqu6 un grand mouvement
national, semblable a celui qoi a
souleve 1'Espagne et l'Allemagne,
un grand mouvement en favour de
l'independance, et ce grand peuple,
au lieu d'etre l'instrument d'un
tyran militaire on de quelque autre
personnage, au lieu d'etre le triste
eaclave de quelques miserablea
petita princes, serait devenu une
formidable barriers dressee ausai
bien contre la France que contre
l'Autriche. La paix et le bonheur
du monde aorait eu un puissant
appui de plus.
' Je Grains fort que l'heure soit
passde.
' Sans comptcr qu'il est lamen-
table de voir de bautes recompenses
accordees a un homme dont la vie
entiere n'a 6te qu'un crime, qui a
ete le complice le plus actif et le
plus intime des forfaits de Bona-
parte, et qui n'a trahi son bienfaiteur
que sous la contraint* de la
necessity le traite qu'on veut
conclure avec lui eat une 8canda-
leuse violation de toua lea grands
principea de justice publique et
privee.' "
The inevitable conclusion is that in at least one case what ia set
before us as the actual text of Bentinck is nothing better than a very
loose paraphrase. But a paraphrase is not documentary evidence, as a
comparison of M. Weil's two versions of this dispatch will show; for in
at least two places one text gives a precisely contradictory statement to
the other (aee the passages given above beginning, Le traiti ne crie pas
seulement un rival, and L'ltalie sous Murat).
a
 This dispatch has served u text for an English magaiine article, quoted with
approval by M. WeiL It may be that he has in one case translated from this arttcl ,
in the other from the text itself. That, however, would be an explanation but not
an excuse. The present article U unfortunately written many hundreds of miles from
the Becord Offioe, otherwise this chain of errors would have been traced more fully
than is actually possible. It must be added that the dispatch quoted is only examined
with a view to testing M. Weil's historical methods.
aurait pu amener,
comma en Eapagne et en Allemagne,
un soulevement national et donner
l'independance au pays.
L'ltalie sous Murat aera une
menace constant* pour la France
et pour l'Autriche, un veritable
danger pour la paix du monde.
' H eat trop tard maintenant.
< Mais c'est chose lamentable de
voir accorder de pareillea faveurs
a un homme dont toute la vie n'a
6t6 qu'un crime, qui a ete l'intime
et actif complice de Bonaparte
et qui ne trahit son bienfaiteur que
par ambition et sous la contrainte
de la neceaaite.'
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